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General description of the contest
Two players compete for a prize V .
Each player chooses an effort level xi given the expected effort level xj of
his rival.
The vector of efforts (xi , xj) determines what each player will finally get.
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The assumptions
Assumption 1. The contest success function pi , describing the effort of
player i relative to the total effort is given by
pi =
xi
xi + xj
.
There are two possible interpretation for pi .
In a Proportional contest, it is interpreted as a share of the prize, in a
Lottery contest as a win probability.
Assumption 2. Players are expected utility maximizer.
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Strategically equivalent contests
Definition (Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2014))
Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same Nash equilibrium
level of effort.
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The case of a deterministic rent
Lottery contest (L)
Payoff
piLi = (V − xi ,−xi ; pi , 1− pi ) .
Expected utility
EUpiLi (x) =
xi
xi + xj
Ui (V − xi ) + xj
xi + xj
Ui (−xi ).
Proportional contest (P)
Payoff
piPi = (piV − xi ; 1) .
Expected utility
EUpiPi (x) = U(
xi
xi + xj
V − xi ).
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The case of risk-neutral players
If players are risk-neutral expected utility maximizer (U(z) = z)
EUpiLi (x) =
xi
xi + xj
V − xi ≡ UEpiLi (x) ≡ UpiPi (x).
Dxi (
xi
xi + xj
V − xi ) = V xj
(xi + xj)
2
− 1.
Theorem
The two contests have Nash equilibrium x∗ = V /4 and are thus
strategically equivalent.
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The case of risk averse players
Assumption 3. The players have constant absolute risk-averse (CARA)
preferences represented by the negative exponential utility function
u(pii ) = − exp(−rpii ),
where r > 0 represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
We can then show that
x∗P =
V
4 .
x∗L =
eVr−1
2r(eVr+1)
= 12r tanh(
Vr
2 ).
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The case of risk-neutral players
Hence,
2r(x∗P − x∗L) = 2r(
V
4
− 1
2r
tanh(
Vr
2
))
=
Vr
2
− tanh(Vr
2
) > 0,
since x ≥ tanh(x), ∀x ≥ 0
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Notations
In this section we suppose that the rent V is a random variable with
density f .
It’s Laplace transform f ∗ is defined by
f ∗(t) = E [exp(tV )].
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The proportional contest
Expected utility:
Eu(pii ) = E (−e−rpii ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(−e−r(piu−xi ))f (u)du
= −erxi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−rpiuf (u)du
= −erxi f ∗( −rxi
xi + xj
).
This gives us an equilibrium effort
x∗P =
1
4
(
f ∗
(− r2)′
f ∗
(− r2)
)
.
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The lottery contest
Expected utility:
Eu(pi1) =
x1
x1 + x2
(
∫ +∞
−∞
(− exp(−r(u − x1))f (u)du) + x2
x1 + x2
(−erx1)
= −x1 exp(rx1)
x1 + x2
(
∫ +∞
−∞
exp(−ru)f (u)du)− x2
x1 + x2
(erx1)
= −x1 exp(rx1)
x1 + x2
f ∗(−r)− x2 exp(rx1)
x1 + x2
.
This gives us an equilibrium effort
x∗L =
1− f ∗(−r)
2r(1 + f ∗(−r)) .
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Differential equation
Strategically equivalent contests thus exist if
1
4
(f ∗)′ (− r2)
f ∗(− r2)
=
1− f ∗(−r)
2r(1 + f ∗(−r)) ,
where f ∗ is the Laplace transform of the density of the rent.
This is a nonlinear, non local differential equation.
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First set of solutions : The exponential law
Let V be exponentially distributed with parameter λ > 0.
Then, f (x) = λe−λx , f ∗(t) = λλ−t for t < λ and (f
∗(t))′ = λ
(t−λ)2 .
Hence,
x∗P =
1
4
(
f ∗
(− r2)′
f ∗
(− r2)
)
=
1
4
 λ(− r2−λ)2
λ
λ−− r
2
 = 1
2r + 4λ
and
x∗L =
1− f ∗(−r)
2r(1 + f ∗(−r)) =
1− λλ−−r
2r(1 + λλ−−r )
=
1
2r + 4λ
⇒
x∗P = x
∗
L =
1
2r + 4λ
.
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Second set of solutions : A polynomial function
Let f ∗(t) = a + bt + ct2.
Then, (f ∗(t))′ = b + 2ct
and we can compute the equilibrium efforts as
x∗P =
1
4(
b−cr
a−b r
2
+c r
2
4
)
x∗L =
1−a+br−cr2
2r(1+a−br+cr2) .
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Second set of solutions : A polynomial function
Both contests are strategically equivalent and f is a density function of a
random variable iff a = 1, c = 0 and 0 < b < 2/r .
In that case, x∗P = x
∗
S =
b
2(2−br) .
Moreover,
f (t) = dirac(t) + b dirac(1, t),
where dirac(1, t) denotes the derivative of dirac(t).
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Open question 1
Are these all possible solution?
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The normal distribution
If the rent is normally distributed with mean V and variance σ2 then
f ∗(r) = exp(rV + 12 r
2σ2) and (f ∗(r))′ =
(
rσ2 + V
)
e
1
2
r2σ2+Vr .
The contest equilibrium levels are then given by
x∗P =
(f ∗)′ (− r2)
4f ∗(− r2)
=
1
4
V − 1
8
rσ2
and
x∗L =
1− f ∗(−r)
2r(1 + f ∗(−r)) =
1− e 12 r2σ2−Vr
2r(1 + e
1
2
r2σ2−Vr )
=
1
2r
tanh(
r
2
(V − 1
2
rσ2)).
Hence,
x∗P − x∗L = 2r(
1
4
V − 1
8
rσ2)− tanh(2r(1
4
V − 1
8
rσ2)) > 0
since x ≥ tanh(x) ∀x ≥ 0.
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The uniform distribution
If the rent is uniformally distributed on an invertavl [a, b] then
f ∗(r) = e
rb−era
r(b−a) and (f
∗)′(r) = − 1
r2(a−b)
(
ear − ebr − arear + brebr).
The contest equilibrium levels are then given by
x∗P =
1
4r
1
e−
1
2
ar − e− 12br
(
2e−
1
2
ar − 2e− 12br + are− 12ar − bre− 12br
)
and
x∗L =
e−br − e−ar + br − ar
2re−ar − 2re−br − 2ar2 + 2br2 .
Again, one can show that X ∗P > X
∗
L .
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Open question 2
Does the proportional contest always dominate the lottery contest?
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